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I. INTRODUCTION
Adolf A. Berle, Jr. is widely regarded as the intellectual pioneer of
corporate governance. Amongst Berle’s numerous legacies is the contemporary status of corporate governance as a distinct, multi-disciplinary
field of academic inquiry. The seminal text which he co-authored with
Gardiner Means in 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(TMC),1 is still recognized by many scholars as the most influential conceptual account of the area of social science we today refer to as corporate governance. On a descriptive level, Berle2 is credited with identifying the separation of ownership and control within public companies that
is a consequence of widely held stock ownership. Furthermore, in view
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1. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter TMC].
2. In our discussion of TMC in this article, we refer to the ideas and conclusions presented in
the book as those of Berle individually. This is partly for the purpose of authorial convenience, and
partly also in acknowledgement of the fact that Berle has been individually accredited with expounding the bulk of the work’s doctrinal and normative arguments. This is not to deny, however, the
invaluable empirical insights provided by Gardiner Means into prevailing ownership structures in
US corporations, without which Berle’s propositions would almost certainly have been impossible.
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of his famous 1932 exchange with contemporary E. Merrick Dodd in the
Harvard Law Review journal,3 Berle became known as the original defender of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in corporate governance. This is the principle that directors (and, indirectly, officers)
should exercise their discretion exclusively in the collective interest of
the firm’s equity holders, as measured by share price and underpinned by
the fiduciary concept in corporate law.4 In response to Dodd’s apparently enlightened exhortation that managers should have “some degree of
legal freedom” to depart from their perceived responsibility to promote
the shareholder interest exclusively,5 Berle famously affirmed corporate
law’s normative orthodoxy with this warning:
[Y]ou can not abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders’ until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.6

As a result of his perceived position on the above issues, Berle is
frequently regarded to be the original intellectual precursor of the
“agency costs” paradigm of corporate governance that attained prominence within corporate law and finance scholarship from the 1970s onwards.7 This is in spite of the fact that many of the normative ideas ad3. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter FWCMAT); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). On this debate, see William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and “The Modern Corporation,”
34 J. CORP. L. 99, 122–35 (2008); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
4. For a more detailed academic exposition of this principle, including an explanation of the
difference between the dual tenets of “shareholder wealth maximization” and “shareholder primacy”
(on which, see infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text), see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003), especially
Part III. Note that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is also distinct from the (more limited)
concept of “shareholder democracy,” on which see infra note 104 and accompanying text.
5. Dodd, supra note 3, at 1161.
6. FWCMAT, supra note 3, at 1367.
7. The “agency costs” paradigm of corporate governance scholarship essentially distills the
subject down to a problem of aligning the conflicting incentive patterns of different corporate participants. On this basis, its proponents suggest a collection of both market-based and contingent legalinstitutional devices (for example, the hostile takeover mechanism and independent boards of directors), which together have the effect of mitigating the tendency of managerial “agents” to appropriate or otherwise diminish the wealth of their shareholder “principals.” The formal autonomy and
independent personhood of the corporation in law, and also the quasi-public decision-making power
which large corporate enterprises are commonly alleged to exercise within society, are both elided
by reference to the fundamentally private bargaining dynamics involved in the formation and internal constitution of companies. At the same time, the logic of the agency costs approach leads in
general to an acceptance of equity holders as the sole legitimate claimant to residual profit and governance rights under corporate law, in view of their unique status as superior economic risk-bearers
amongst the general set of “inputs” constituting the business firm. Hence, agency costs approaches
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vanced by Berle, both in TMC itself and in his (more normatively developed) future writing, appear to run starkly against the grain of many of
the fundamental tenets of this later school of thought. Therefore in
studying Berle’s work through a contemporary lens, it is customary to
view Berle as having ideologically changed course over his scholarly
career, from his initial position as a conservative shareholder wealth
maximization advocate to his later position as a reformist communitarian
theorist.8 Orthodox interpretations of Berleian theory would suggest that
the allegedly “conservative” dimension of Berle’s thinking is characterized by the majority of his earlier inter-war work, principally the doctrinal (middle) chapters of TMC (1932),9 Berle’s contemporaneous article
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note (1932)
(“FWCMAT”), 10 and his formative doctrinal article on corporate law
entitled Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust (1931).11 The more “reformist” dimension of Berle’s scholarship, on the other hand, is felt to be
exemplified by the concluding book of TMC (titled “Reorientation of
Enterprise”) along with Berle’s later post-war works The 20th Century
Capitalist Revolution (1954), 12 Power Without Property (1959), 13 and
The American Economic Republic (1963).14
to corporate governance tend to provide ideological support for the shareholder wealth maximization
norm in corporate law, not as a moral-proprietary imperative but rather as a functional precondition
for engendering efficient and socially beneficial outcomes from a corporation’s productive and
wealth-generating activities (for more on this, see infra note 94–95 and accompanying text). The
path-breaking articles in the construction of the agency costs approach are: Michael C. Jensen &
William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88
J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); and Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). For an influential application of the agency costs paradigm in
rationalizing the structure and rules of corporate law, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, (Harvard, Cambridge, MA paperback
ed. 1996) (1991); BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION
(1998) (dealing with the US and UK systems of corporate law respectively). For a critical perspective on the conceptual relevance of agency costs theory to US corporate governance and law today,
see Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, From Minimization to Exploitation: Re-Conceptualizing
the Corporate Governance Problem (Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest, Working Paper
No. REFGOV-CG-32), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324127.
8. For analysis stressing the ambiguity or duality of TMC and Berle’s thinking, see, for example, Bratton & Wachter, supra note 3; J.A.C. Hetherington, Redefining the Task of Corporation Law,
19 U.S.F. L. REV. 229 (1985); Allan C. Hutchinson, Public Policy and Private Cupidity: Berle and
Means
Re-Visioned
3
(CLPE
Research
Paper
No.
3/2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961292.
9. TMC, supra note 1.
10. See FWCMAT, supra note 3.
11. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
12. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959) [hereinafter PWP].
14. ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC (1963) [hereinafter AER].
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The convenience of interpreting Berle in this way is that it allows
the reader to link the majority of Berle’s earlier thinking on corporate
governance to the later agency costs paradigm,15 while at the same time
compartmentalizing those aspects of his (mainly later) work that do not
support this purported connection. In this way, the more radical, communitarian strand of Berle’s normative thought can be regarded mainly
as the historically-specific product of America’s peculiar postwar politico-economic climate, 16 thus meriting it being analyzed in distinction
from Berle’s more “mainstream” positive insights into the structure of
American public companies. Thus, Berle’s prescriptive ideas regarding
re-appraisal of the rightful beneficiaries of the corporate wealth-creation
process have now fallen by the intellectual wayside. However, his primarily descriptive insights revealed in TMC about the structure of the
dual ownership and control relation in public companies have undoubtedly retained considerable influence over the ensuing decades.17
This article takes issue with such bipolar understandings of Berle’s
work—the various strands of which we believe are too tightly interlinked
to be separated into constituent positive and normative elements. In particular, we argue that, on a normative level, TMC is most appropriately
viewed not as a sui generis project, but rather as one (early) part of a
wider continuum of ideas advanced by Berle over the course of the following three decades. By reading TMC in this contextual sense, it becomes possible to regard it as one aspect of a wider lifelong inquiry by
Berle into the whole panoply of civil society pressures shaping the
course of corporate-managerial decision-making, as opposed to a primarily empirical or doctrinal study into corporate law and ownership structures whose core descriptive conclusions can be extrapolated from the
above and viewed in their own terms. Accordingly, TMC’s more radical
normative propositions, especially those in the final chapter of the work,
assume a more dynamic and time-robust character.
We accordingly present one such contextual and integral understanding of Berle’s ideas; we aim at both highlighting and analyzing this
wider institutional quality of his corporate governance scholarship. For
this purpose, we rely principally on the two Berleian texts which are
most heavily associated with his work on corporate governance; namely,
TMC (1932) itself (notably including Berle’s 1968 updates to the original
15. On this, see supra note 7.
16. For an analysis of the peculiarity (at least by contemporary standards) of the corporatist
politico-economic context in which Berle’s ideas were developed, see Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 3.
17. See, e.g., the foundational references to Berle and Means in the seminal agency costs literature cited at supra note 7.
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version)18 and Power Without Property (1959).19 Furthermore, we analyze Berle’s overall corporate governance project in accordance with
what we see as its four core sub-themes:
A. the limitations of external market forces as a constraint on managerial decision-making power;
B. the desirability of internal (corporate) over external (market) actors in allocating corporate capital;
C. civil society and the public consensus as a continuous informal
check on managerial decision-making power; and
D. shareholder democracy (as opposed to shareholder primacy or
shareholder wealth maximization)20 as a socially instrumental institution.

In Part II of this article, we seek to debunk the popular misconception that Berle’s early work was a defense of the orthodox shareholder
primacy paradigm of corporate governance. This prefaces our analysis
in Part III, where we set out and, in turn, examine each of the above four
sub-themes of Berle’s overall thinking on corporate governance. A recurring theme in this part of our discussion is the over-simplicity of attempting to connect Berle’s thinking to the later agency costs paradigm
of corporate governance, which we believe fails to reflect the normative
and institutional richness of Berle’s overall social-scientific project. In
Part IV, we build on these insights by assessing the effects of our reinterpretation of Berle’s work on contemporary corporate governance
debates. We suggest here that Berle’s lifetime work on corporate governance, when considered in an integral and non-selective way, provides
the basis for a realistic and dynamic understanding of the concept of
shareholder democracy and its relationship with wider civil society
processes of public and political opinion formation.
II. DEBUNKING A POPULAR MYTH ABOUT BERLE
To anyone familiar with Berle’s doctrinal analysis in the middle
chapters of TMC, depiction of him as the forefather of the agency costs
paradigm of corporate governance is not entirely without reasonable basis. In this part of his great work with Means, Berle advanced the following (arguably questionable) positive thesis:

18. See TMC, supra note 1.
19. See PWP, supra note 13.
20. On the distinction between these terms, see supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra
notes 94–95, 104 and accompanying text.
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[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a
corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived
from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.21

Berle consequently posited his “trusteeship” model of corporate law,
which denoted that the legitimacy of any corporate act must be assessed,
not only by the technical rules of law pertaining to that conduct, but also
by a modified22 version of the equitable rules that apply to a trustee’s
powers to administer property vested in them as a fiduciary for the trust’s
beneficiary.23 Certainly, a selective reading of the above excerpt, viewed
alongside Berle’s contemporaneous FWCMAT piece, 24 provides see-

21. TMC, supra note 1, at 220; see also Berle Jr., supra note 11.
22. In particular, Berle claimed that it was necessary to adapt the basic laws of trusteeship so as
to render them less rigorous and therefore more responsive to the wide ambit of flexibility necessarily involved in business decision-making. See TMC, supra note 1, at 242.
23. Berle’s purported trusteeship principle is fundamentally similar to the contemporary shareholder wealth maximization norm, albeit with one significant difference. Whereas the shareholder
wealth maximization norm requires simply that a director exercise his official discretion in a manner
that is broadly calculated to enhance the market value of the equity holder’s residual claim against
the company, the trusteeship principle goes further by asserting that a director must not use any
statutory or constitutional powers vested in him except in accordance with the purpose for which
they were granted (i.e., to promote the collective interest of shareholders within the legitimate
bounds of the company’s constitutional structure) and not for any extraneous motive. Although
these two principles are largely consistent with one another insofar as their practical implications for
directors are concerned, it would appear that they can potentially dictate different courses of action
in a situation where a company is subject to a takeover bid by way of a hostile (i.e., unsolicited)
tender offer to its existing shareholders. In this scenario, deployment by the board of a defensive
tactic (e.g., a shareholder rights plan) which has the intended effect of diluting the offeror’s holding
or otherwise reducing the attractiveness of the bid target may be entirely consistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm where the target company’s directors honestly and rationally
perceive the bid, for whatever reasons, to represent inadequate value for its shareholders. However,
such a defensive response by the board would arguably be contrary to the trusteeship principle insofar as it represents an illegitimate use of the directors’ fiduciary powers for the purpose of distorting
the company’s existing balance of voting power, and thereby usurping the existing shareholders’
constitutional prerogative to decide whether the price offered by the bidder is acceptable in light of
their own personal preferences as beneficiaries of the notional corporate “trust.” Although (at least
to the best of the authors’ knowledge) Berle did not explicitly discuss the application of the trusteeship principle in the context of contests for control, the above purported application of the principle
would appear to the authors to be justified by analogy with its closest comparative equivalent; namely, the English “proper purpose” doctrine. The latter doctrine is widely acknowledged in England to
provide a judicial safeguard to a company’s existing democratic governance structure in the face of
undue directorial interference, even in situations where such action would otherwise be justifiable as
an exercise of the board’s honest and informed business judgment as to what they believe to be in
the best interests of the shareholders. On this, see Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254; Howard
Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] 1 All ER 1126 (P.C.) (appeal taken from the Supreme
Court of New South Wales); J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN
THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 137–140 (1993).
24. See FWCMAT, supra note 3.
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mingly cogent evidence in support of the “Berle as shareholder wealth
maximization advocate” hypothesis.
A more integral analysis of Berle’s overall normative position in
TMC establishes, however, that his trusteeship model was intended only
as a temporary doctrinal stopgap against what he saw as the corporate
control vacuum. This was pending fuller and more fundamental resolution of the accountability and legitimacy problems posed by the public
corporate form. While advancing his shareholder-centric conceptualization of corporate law, Berle at the same time expressed his “full realization of the possibility that private property may one day cease to be the
basic concept in terms of which the courts handle problems of large scale
enterprise and that the corporate mechanism may prove the very means
through which such modification is brought about.”25 He nevertheless
conceded on grounds of pragmatism that “[u]ntil this modification does
occur, . . . the lawyer is forced to think in terms of private property.”26
Berle therefore claimed that shareholder primacy, by means of the trusteeship principle, was justifiable in the immediate term not only as the
least worst solution to the problem of managerial hegemony,27 but also as
the only logical response to the corporate accountability deficit available
within the doctrinal machinery of the common law. This was because of
what he described as the common law’s “ancient preoccupation” with
protecting the property and other private interests of individuals in their
relationships with one another. Thus, common law logic was illequipped for setting up “ideal schemes of government” via regulation of
managerial conduct in the interests of the public at large.28
In any event, Berle believed that the trusteeship principle could only ever represent, at best, a partial solution to the corporate accountability
deficit, given the inevitable judicial difficulties involved in striking an
effective balance between: (a) preserving managerial discretion to make
various and complex commercial decisions; and (b) mitigating the scope
for abuse by directors and managers of their official powers and prerogatives at the shareholders’ expense. Berle therefore opined that ultimately, a shareholder’s welfare remained largely dependent on “the expectation of fair dealing” by managers as opposed to any concrete and defens-

25. TMC, supra note 1, at 219.
26. Id. at 219–20.
27. For an analysis of managerial power as the crucial issue at the heart of TMC, see Dalia
Tsuck Mitchell, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century American
Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 194 (2005) (“The separation of ownership from control was important to the extent that it contributed to the amassing of corporate power and pointed to
ways to tame potential excesses and abuses of corporate power.”).
28. TMC, supra note 1, at 296.
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ible legal basis.29 In view of this fact, Berle made the somewhat bleak
assessment that, even accounting for the existence of his proposed trusteeship model of corporate law, “the shareholder in the modern corporate
situation has surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite
expectations” and, in consequence, “is definitely made subservient to the
will of a controlling group of managers.”30 This would seem to imply
that in spite of his best efforts to this effect in TMC, Berle came to the
pessimistic conclusion that the search for a legal principle to mitigate
managerial hegemony vis-à-vis shareholders was an ultimately futile endeavor.31
It would therefore appear that, contrary to current interpretations of
his work, Berle did not view shareholder disempowerment and managerial hegemony as problems that were in the long-term either remediable or reversible. On the contrary, he argued that “the reason for the
weakening of the shareholder’s position lay as much in his inability to
manage as in the obvious willingness of the ‘control’ to take over.”32 In
other words, the corporate accountability deficit was due as much to the
inevitable control failings of ineffective shareholders as it was to the acquisitiveness of power-hungry managers, and the surrounding corporate
law framework had evolved so as to adapt to this economic fact. It was
seemingly with this consideration in mind that Berle, in the end, lamented the possibility that “the bulk of American industry might soon be
operated by trustees for the benefit of inactive and irresponsible security
owners.”33 He nonetheless took solace in his expectation that “[w]hen a
convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today must
yield before the larger interests of society.”34
The picture that emerges of Berle from an integral reading of TMC
is not that of a staid conservative fighting against the winds of change,
but rather of a radical social reformist possessed with an unusually strong
pragmatic trait. In other words, Berle looked to mobilize significant
reform but nevertheless acknowledged the incapacity of the available
(legal) institutional ammunition to bring his proposed vision into immediate and definite effect. On a normative level, however, Berle’s work
on the whole was much more concerned with exploiting the long-term
transformative potential of the separation of ownership and control than
29. Id. at 243.
30. Id. at 244.
31. On this point, see Antoine Rebérioux, Does Shareholder Primacy Lead to a Decline in
Managerial Accountability?, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 507, 513 (2007).
32. TMC, supra note 1, at 131.
33. Id. at 311.
34. Id. at 312.
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mitigating the perceived adverse consequences of that phenomenon in
the short term.35
III. BERLE’S OVERALL INSTITUTIONAL PROJECT
Introduction
The principal reason for Berle’s rejection of shareholder legal empowerment as a long-term solution to the corporate accountability deficit
was the impossibility, as he saw it, of bringing about effective shareholder influence over corporate affairs. This was due in part to the doctrinal
limitations of the common law as a reformist mechanism in the field of
corporate law, as discussed in the previous Part. But it was also attributable, at least in equal part, to the internal autonomy of the capital allocation process within large-scale corporate enterprises. As a result of this
process, shareholders became externalized from the corporation both as a
continuing source of industrial finance and, in turn, a managerialdisciplinary mechanism. However, Berle, far from viewing this as an
inhibition of the modern corporate structure, in contrast saw it as an opportunity for replacing the now redundant “invisible hand” of market
pressures with the much more effective governance influence of an energized civil society and regulatory state. Whilst, as we will observe,
shareholders still had a role to play within Berle’s publicly-oriented managerialist control framework, it was in a more limited capacity and with
markedly fewer legal entitlements than they had previously been felt to
merit.
We begin this Part by highlighting Berle’s argument as to the ineffectiveness of external market forces as a constraint on managerial decision-making power. Second, we discuss Berle’s view that internal (managerial) actors were superior to external (market) actors in allocating
corporate industrial capital. Third, we examine how, with the diminution
of product and capital markets as an effective constraint on managerial
hegemony, the substitute influence of civil society pressures and the
evolving public consensus came to fill this control vacuum. Finally, we
assess the continuing role and position of the shareholder within this institutional framework as perceived by Berle.
A. The Limitations of External Market Forces as a Constraint on Managerial Decision-Making Power
In Power Without Property, Berle criticized “[c]lassical nineteenthcentury thinking” on the basis that it “ignored rather than avoided the
35. For a fuller argument to this effect, see Moore & Rebérioux, supra note 7.
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economic power problem,” by incorrectly considering “economic power
as ultimately and irresistibly controlled by the force of an impersonal
open market.”36 In constructing his institutional model of corporate governance, Berle was dismissive of the various markets which were alleged to exert extraneous constraints on managers’ executive discretion.
This led Berle to the conclusion that managerial hegemony remained a
prevalent feature of the modern corporation, even when accounting for
the combined operation of the markets for corporate products, capital,
and control.
Consistent with other progressive managerialist scholars of his
time, such as John Kenneth Galbraith,37 Berle was aware that the modern
conditions of industrial concentration and oligopoly significantly limited
the product market’s ability to function as a competitive disciplinary
force. 38 He did, however, acknowledge the potential of the corporate
capital market as a competitive restraint on otherwise hegemonic managerially-controlled firms. In particular, Berle noted in TMC that “over
half of the recent phenomenal growth of the great corporations was
achieved through the raising of new capital in the public markets.” 39
Berle consequently regarded the principal market-based safeguard of the
shareholder interest to be the necessity for corporations to, from time to
time, raise capital from the general public. This would, in theory, compel their managers to maintain favor with the investor community on an
ongoing basis. In this regard, Berle’s early thinking arguably bears a
degree of similarity to his intellectual descendants versed in the “agency
costs” school of thought, who advance the capital market as the principal
institutional mechanism for mitigating (whether directly or indirectly)40
the adverse incentives that managers would otherwise have to “shirk” in
the performance of their tasks.41
However, Berle’s initial apparent belief in the disciplinary effectiveness of the capital market did not become a mainstay of his thinking.
Although in the first (1932) edition of TMC Berle appeared to attach at
least some degree of significance to the corporate capital market as a po36. PWP, supra note 13, at 85.
37. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 81–109 (1973).
38. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 434 (1962) (“[T]he aggregate of industry, both in size and in relative importance, has established undoubted dominance. Concentration within it is thus markedly more powerful relative to
total production and in the total economic scene today than it was in 1932.”).
39. TMC, supra note 1, at 62.
40. In other words, the question is whether to mitigate adverse incentives via the direct market
discipline of having to maintain access to low-cost capital from the investing public, or the indirect
imperative of precluding the advances of a potential hostile takeover bidder. For more information
on this point, see infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
41. On this concept generally, see Fama, supra note 7.
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tential institutional constraint on managerial hegemony, in the later 1968
edition of the same work he was considerably less emphatic about its
value in this regard. In his preface to the 1968 edition, Berle reported
empirical evidence that over sixty percent of corporate investment capital
was generated by corporations internally from retained earnings, while
only less than twenty percent of capital was amassed from the issuance
of securities—most of which took the form of fixed-interest bonds as
opposed to equities.42 Berle also disparaged his late contemporary Henry
Manne’s (soon-to-be-influential) theory that the stock market could indirectly discipline corporate managers by means of the contingent market
for corporate control. Manne suggested that this process would be triggered in cases where managerial underperformance inspired a proxy
fight by outsiders to gain effective control over the shareholder franchise.43 In response, Berle argued that “in most really large corporations
[proxy fights] never occur at all.”44 He further argued that in the extraordinary instance where a contest for voting control of a corporation
does occur, it is “quite obviously a sheer struggle between two tycoons
for power,” and thus to depict it as a market-driven phenomenon
amounts to “mere misdescription.”45
In view of the above factors, Berle believed that by 1968,
“[p]urchases and sales on the New York and other stock exchanges [did]
42. See Adolf Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the Revised Edition of
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY, at xv (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter Berle, 1968
Introduction]. See also Berle, supra note 38, at 440 (concluding that “[p]ublic utilities aside, the
large corporations do not seek substantial capital either by floating bonds or new stock issues, save
on very rare occasions.”).
43. On this, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965); Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 410–13 (1962). For an excellent summary and critical analysis of the
Berle/Manne exchange generally, see Paddy Ireland, Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and
the Reprivatization of the Public Company, in JOHN PARKINSON ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE COMPANY 141, 154–55 (2000).
44. Berle, supra note 38, at 439.
45. Id. Berle did, however, acknowledge the existence of another staple institution of the
agency costs paradigm of corporate governance, namely the market for managerial talent. In Modern Functions, he accepted that corporations “compete in hiring promising graduates of business
schools and in persuading executive vice presidents to leave the service of one corporation and enter
another.” Id. Berle nonetheless regarded the corporate hiring process as being driven solely by the
managerial community itself with no extraneous influence whatsoever from either shareholders or
proxy fight participants. Berle was also dismissive of any purported rationality underlying the managerial labor market. In PWP, he compared what he called “the catch-and-toss of the [American]
market for personal talent” with the alternative Soviet Russian system for relative attribution of
intra-firm rewards, and queried with all seriousness “whether the arbitrariness and injustice of a
bureaucratic—any bureaucratic—system [of allocating relative organizational rewards to employees]
are not greater than the accidents and irrationalities of the American market system.” PWP, supra
note 13, at 145.
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not seriously affect the business operations of the companies whose
shares [were] the subject of trading.”46
He argued that “one effect of the corporate system has been to set
up a parallel, circulating ‘property-wealth’ system, in which the wealth
flows from passive wealth-holder to passive wealth-holder, without significantly furthering the functions of capital formation, capital application, capital use or risk bearing.”47
It would therefore appear that by the time of his death in 1971,
Berle had come to the opinion that the complete externalization of shareholders from corporate governance had been substantially realized.48
B. The Desirability of Internal (Managerial) Over External (Market)
Actors in Allocating Corporate Capital
Crucially, Berle was not, in the long run, principally bothered by
the issue of shareholder disempowerment vis-à-vis hegemonic managers.
On the contrary, he viewed the externalization of shareholders from the
corporate productive process as an ultimately progressive economic development. Whilst Berle was cognizant of the accountability deficit that
resulted from managers’ increasing autonomy over the capital allocation
process, he also lauded this deficit as one of the novel advantages of the
modern corporate property-holding system. The beneficial outcome of
this development, according to Berle, was that the “distribution and redistribution of wealth-holding [could] take place without interruption of
the productive process”49 so that the corporation, in effect, could “run on
its own economic steam.”50 Berle demonstrated a strong preference for
internal over external methods of capital allocation51 for two principal
(and overlapping) reasons. First, Berle possessed a longstanding lack of
faith in the informational efficiency of public stock markets. Second,

46. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xxiv.
47. Id. at xxii. In this regard, Berle recognized that the then-growing body of securities law
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission was not concerned with the underlying
affairs of corporations but rather with the separate process of ensuring that buyers and sellers on
liquid securities markets had sufficient information to make prudent decisions on the relative prices
of shares. Id. at xxi.
48. Writing in 1962, Berle even went so far as to opine (by his own admission slightly tentatively) that the shareholder’s beneficial interest “has been completely, solidly, and finally severed
from the economic and productive enterprise of the corporation whose shares form the corpus of the
trust, on whose success, at long last, he and his fellow beneficiaries depend.” Berle, supra note 38,
at 448 (emphasis added).
49. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xxiv.
50. Id. at xv.
51. In this regard, Berle emphatically claimed: “[p]robably the greatest single power inherent
in corporate managements is their allocation of the risk capital they thus accumulate.” Berle, supra
note 38, at 441.
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Berle was concerned about the social harm that could be caused by empowering irrational securities investors as corporate governance actors.
As to the first of these factors, Berle’s skepticism about the rationality of securities markets is a further characteristic that distinguishes
him from his descendants versed in the “agency costs” school of thought,
whose reasoning is contrarily underpinned by a uniting faith in one or
another version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH). In
essence, the ECMH emphasizes (in varying degrees) the purported tendency of securities market prices to reflect the information that is relevant to the future income-generating potential of any particular security—which in the case of a corporate equity investment will naturally include data pertaining to the underlying performance and prospects of the
relevant company’s business. Most proponents of the ECMH within law
and finance theory appear to recognize the inevitable limitations of the
various securities market mechanisms (e.g. securities analysts, stock exchange disclosure rules, and investment banks’ securities underwriting
activities) that in practice bring about the ongoing process of “datatransfer” from the internal (corporate) to external (market) environment.
Nonetheless, “agency costs” approaches to corporate governance are
generally united in their preference for external (market) over internal
(managerial) methods of capital allocation, as derived from a Hayekian
belief in the superior computational capacity of dispersed market actors
over concentrated organizational technocrats.52
Needless to say, Berle did not share this belief. In TMC, he referred
to “the great swings in society’s appraisal of its own immediate future as
reflected in the general level of values in the organized markets,”53—a
critique that would be echoed in greater detail by John Maynard Keynes
four years later in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.54 Berle argued that “liquid55 property, at least under the corporate
52. On the ECMH generally, see Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). For more critical analyses of the ECMH, see ROBERT J.
SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, (2003) 28 J. CORP. L. 715
(2003); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2002); Lynn A.
Stout, Inefficient Markets and the New Finance, 14 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 95 (2005).
53. TMC, supra note 1, at 65.
54 . JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY (1936).
55. The characteristic of “liquidity” denotes the ease with which a commodity or investment
can be readily transferred into cash. Relatively small-scale corporate equity investments which are
traded on deep regulated securities markets (such as the New York Stock Exchange) are regarded to
be highly liquid in nature in contrast to relatively large-scale entrepreneurial, family or private equity
investments, which tend to be viewed as highly illiquid. The implication of this distinction for corporate governance, as explained further below, is that illiquidity in a sense “fixes” the investor to the
underlying property (e.g., the relevant company’s business), whereas liquidity facilitates an effective
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system, obtains a set of values in exchange, represented by market prices,
which are not immediately dependent upon, or at least only obliquely
connected with, the underlying values of the properties themselves.”56
Berle’s skepticism as to the reliability of stock market pricing appears to
be much more severe in his later writing. In AER, for instance, he observed how “[v]aguely, moving from one inexact calculation to another,
the market arrives at a purely romantic estimate of what a share of General Motors or General Electric is worth.”57
This leads to Berle’s second, and arguably more serious, concern
about the adverse influence of external capital markets on corporate governance. Similarly to Keynes, Berle’s principal concern with securities
markets was not so much that investors lacked the relevant information
required to make rational decisions in their own interests, but rather that
they possessed the wrong kind of incentives to make decisions that would
further the productivity and effectiveness of the corporations in which
they were invested. Therefore, rather than regarding shareholders as being the “victims” of managerial prerogative in any meaningful sense,
Berle was, on the whole, much more concerned about the potential harm
that shareholders, if institutionally empowered, could cause to the corporation by virtue of the peculiar incentives and considerations underlying
their investment decisions.
Berle claimed that estimations of share value are typically based not
on entrepreneurial predictions of advances in “economic operation,” but
merely on likely future changes in the value of those shares themselves
(echoing Keynes’ famous “prettiest face competition” metaphor from his
General Theory).58 Both Keynes and Berle contrasted the transient and
fleeting quality of financial capital (liquidity) with the more entrenched
and durable nature of corporate industrial capital. Keynes believed that
“[d]ecisions to invest in private business of the old-fashioned [entrepreneurial] type were . . . largely irrevocable, not only for the community as
a whole, but also for the individual.”59 However,
[w]ith the separation between ownership and management which
prevails to-day and with the development of organised investment
markets, a new factor of great importance has entered in . . . [insofar
as] the Stock Exchange revalues many investments every day and
the revaluations give a frequent opportunity to the individual
divorce between the investor and underlying property by rendering the investor dependent principally on the investment’s external market-realization value, rather than internal yield value, in order to
secure an effective rate of return on it. On this, see AER, supra note 14, at 25.
56. TMC, supra note 1, at 250.
57. AER, supra note 14, at 32.
58. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xxiii.
59. KEYNES, supra note 54, at 150.
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(though not to the community as a whole) to revise his commitments.60

Berle and Keynes recognized that the vast majority of stock exchange transactions involved the mere transfer of historical investments
in companies that had long since fulfilled their industrial purpose. However, both writers acknowledged that the price of a company’s securities
on the secondary trading market could potentially affect that company’s
capacity to raise funds on the primary capital market by determining the
acceptable price of any future public offering. It followed that, so long
as companies were dependent at least to some extent on the external
capital market as a continuing source of finance, there was a corresponding risk that the skewed incentives and horizons of securities investors
would have a detrimental effect on industrial capital allocation. While
Berle’s belief that the passivity of the American shareholder populace
precluded the need for direct examination of the potential evils of excessive shareholder influence over corporate capital allocation, Keynes (referring to the less managerially-intensive British corporate governance
system) was aware of the adverse effect on national investment and
productivity that resulted “[w]hen the capital development of a country
becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino.”61
Berle’s recognition of the potentially detrimental implications of
involving securities market actors in industrial capital decisions led him
to embrace the shareholder’s externalization from corporate control as an
overall progressive social development. In Berle’s view, it was this phenomenon more than any other that enabled the condition of capital liquidity to persist in tandem with the continuing productive demands of
the business enterprise. In this way, both industrial corporations and securities markets can most effectively fulfill their respective social objectives (crudely speaking, industrial productivity and financial accumulation) in general autonomy from one another, irrespective of the underlying link between these two institutions represented by the phenomenon
of liquid corporate equity.
In conclusion, therefore, Berle felt that the externalization of shareholders from corporate financing and governance was a socially desirable phenomenon that should ultimately be encouraged. Berle preferred
capital allocation to be determined by autonomous managers using internal capital reserves and situated within the corporate organization itself.
This was because, in Berle’s view, expert corporate managers were considerably better situated and equipped than external securities market
60. Id. at 150–51.
61. Id. at 159.
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actors to determine the appropriate rate and direction of industrial development.
C. Civil Society and the Public Consensus as an Informal Check on
Managerial Decision-Making Power
Berle’s emphatic defense of managerial autonomy from external
market influences did not, however, blind him from the significant accountability problems that such autonomy posed. In TMC, Berle warned
of the potential power reach of the “new princes” of industry62 that the
public corporate form had created. Berle, more than anyone, was aware
of the disastrous socio-political consequences that could follow from the
exercise of untrammeled managerial discretion. Berle observed how, as
a “social organization,” the modern corporation “involves a concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of
religious power in the mediaeval church or of political power in the national state.”63 On this basis, he surmised that “more could be learned
regarding [corporate controllers] by studying the motives of an Alexander the Great, seeking new worlds to conquer, than by considering the
motives of a petty tradesman of the days of Adam Smith.”64
At the same time, Berle observed the fact that throughout history
“[a] constant warfare has existed between the individuals wielding power, in whatever form, and the subjects of that power,” and that “[j]ust as
there is a continuous desire for power, so also there is a continuous desire
to make that power the servant of the bulk of the individuals it affects.”65
In particular, Berle observed within contemporary American society an
“insistence that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the
same tests of public benefit which have been applied in their turn to
power otherwise located,”66 and argued that “[w]hen a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in
that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the
larger interests of society.” 67 On this basis, Berle predicted a future
where corporate law assumes the status of “a potential constitutional law
for the new economic state,” with business practice in its turn “increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship.”68 Berle envisaged the corporate managerial sector ultimately assuming the status of
62. TMC, supra note 1, at 116.
63. Id. at 309.
64. Id. at 307–08.
65. Id. at 310.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 312.
68. Id. at 313.
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“a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various
groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income
stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”69
There is an inclination amongst scholars to regard these radical
propositions forwarded by Berle in the final chapter of TMC as an exceptional feature of the book—the product of misty-eyed political optimism
as contrasted with Berle’s sober and hard-nosed doctrinal legal scholarship70 in the work’s previous chapters. It tends to follow that, from this
view, the normative arguments of TMC’s closing chapter are most appropriately regarded as an ideological anomaly of the work—a hopeful
but, sadly, forever incomplete project to institutionalize, via legal means,
a truly pluralist (or at least non-proprietary) system for allocating corporate residual wealth within society. Once the “unsuccessful” normative
aspect of Berle’s work is cast aside in this way, readers can focus on the
more “successful” positive aspects of received Berleian theory that are
indeed borne out by the succeeding course of historical events, such as
the separation of ownership and control and remedial shareholder wealth
maximization norm. Such a conclusion is understandable if one regards
TMC’s normative legacy as being purely about the reform of doctrinal
corporate law. However, if one instead regards TMC as part of a wider
inquiry by Berle into the multifarious civil society pressures acting on
corporate managers, including but not restricted to the formal law, the
book’s normative propositions acquire a more constructive and lasting
significance for social scientists.
Indeed, the essential idea advanced by Berle in TMC’s concluding
chapter, in which corporate power is ultimately accountable to an external and dynamic body of public opinion, was by no means left at the intellectual wayside by Berle following completion of this seminal text.
On the contrary, it became a core and coordinating influence of much of
Berle’s future thinking on corporate governance—most notably in his
classic 1959 work Power Without Property.71
It was here that Berle developed his theory of the “public consensus,” which he defined as “the existence of a set of ideas, widely held by
the community, and often by the organization itself and the men who
direct it, that certain uses of power are ‘wrong,’ that is, contrary to the
established interest and value system of the community.”72 A key component of Berle’s “public consensus” theory was the idea that individual
citizens, while having been largely externalized from the corporate deci69. Id. at 312–13.
70. Coupled with Gardiner Means’s equally rigorous empirical economic analysis.
71. PWP, supra note 13.
72. Id. at 90.
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sion-making process in their economic capacity as shareholders, had
nevertheless at the same time acquired an increasing degree of influence
over corporate affairs in their political capacity as engaged civil society
actors.73 In a profoundly optimistic passage of PWP, Berle opined that:
In terms of industrial property, the system has unquestionably reduced most owners to a passive-receptive role. But in terms of
choice of life and choice of political expression, the citizen of the
American economic republic probably has as effective a means of
control as individuals have ever achieved in a large country.74

Berle explained that the public consensus is the body of “general,
unstated premises” 75 that provides a basis for the ongoing and often
spontaneous process of public opinion formation in respect to any controversial social issue. Although the public consensus itself is unwritten
and unsystematic, it can be elicited by reference to (inter alia) “the conclusions of careful university professors, the reasoned opinions of specialists, the statements of responsible journalists, and at times the solid
pronouncements of respected politicians.”76 Moreover, while the public
consensus contains reference to settled rules of law, “it also includes capacity to criticize that law” and “to insist that principles heretofore comprised only within the consensus must be added to statute or common
law, enforceable by courts as well as by public opinion.”77
Berle argued that, in the first place, the public consensus was effectively “enforced” on managers by means of the “corporate conscience,”
which was represented by managers’ own internal appreciation of the
external public consensus.78 It followed that breach of the public consensus would lead to “loss of prestige, public standing, and popular esteem for the men in the organization itself as loyalty to it is undermined.”79 In the event that these informal sanctions failed to produce the
desired changes in managerial conduct, more coercive sanctions were
likely to follow in the form of interventionist regulation by the political
state.80 In this regard, Berle claimed that “[h]owever powerless any individual may be to deal with economic organization on the economic
plane, he does have, in the American democracy, a solid and respected
power in the political field.”81 Berle believed that “[i]f enough individu73. See id. at 117.
74. Id. at 138.
75. Id. at 111.
76. Id. at 113.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 91.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 92.
81. Id.
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als consider that they are aggrieved, they can energize a political intervention,” and that “[i]n American society, the ultimate limitation on economic power is the possibility of energizing, in any one of various ways,
the political power of the government.”82 Consequently, political intervention by the state in the event of violation of the public consensus was,
in Berle’s view, a “near-certainty.”83 Berle further claimed that the public consensus, although inchoate, is nevertheless “a continuously existent
force, capable of becoming active and specific, because in a democratic
system it can energize action by the State.”84
Although Berle did not explicitly discuss exactly what the American public consensus demanded of any specific type of corporation, he
did make one important observation concerning the way in which the
legitimacy of corporate power is judged by the general public. Berle
claimed that “[p]ower (aside from its crude or brute form) cannot exist
apart from some idea or principle justifying it and, therefore, entitling
holders of it to expect allegiance and cooperation.”85 According to this
logic, “[e]conomic power is justified chiefly by the fact that it is needed
to produce, supply, and distribute goods and services, and to set up attendant conditions of employment and service appropriate to these
ends.”86 Berle argued that “[s]o long as an economic organization, Statist or non-Statist, acquires and uses its power to perform this function, it
holds and is using the tool for the purpose which justifies its existence.”87
Berle referred to the tendency of corporate activity to acquire a
“functional definition” by assuming a social obligation to fulfill a particular economic task.88 By this process, “the American consumer accepts
enterprise in corporate form as a way of getting its economic decrees
fulfilled.”89 In turn, the prevailing public expectation as to the corporation’s proper socio-economic function is internalized by managers themselves, such that they “come to recognize (perhaps as ‘business statesmen’) that first claim on accumulated profits is the claim of the enterprise itself,” and that the perceived needs of the community in respect of
the firm’s continuing productive operations “take precedence over the
dividend desires of any body of passive stockholders.”90

82. Id.
83. Id. at 114.
84. Id. at 115.
85. Id. at 100.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 101.
89. Id. at 102.
90. Berle, supra note 38, at 449 (emphasis in original).
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The reliance placed on any corporation by the community also
tends to increase in direct relation to its size—to the extent that it commands a sufficiently large share of its market so as to become essential to
the community.91 At that point, deprivation of supply or any other misuse by the corporation of its market position (e.g. functionally unnecessary or socially unacceptable price rises) will be sanctioned in effect by
the state, which will assume responsibility for providing the relevant service in place of the exploitative corporation.92 This was particularly so
where a corporation used its market power to increase prices to socially
excessive levels by deliberately restricting supply of a good or service
below the estimated level of demand for it; this, in Berle’s view, would
amount to a breach of the “powerful tenet in the public consensus that
the great corporations on which the American community relies for
supply must meet the demand.”93
The dual effect of Berle’s managerial autonomy and public consensus theories was the removal of the corporate decision-making process,
to a significant extent, from the control of extraneous (product and capital) market forces, which were eventually replaced by endogenous public
and political pressures. In Berle’s view, these latter pressures were at the
very least as stringent a constraint on managerial decision-making as the
former type, and were considerably better suited than the former type to
the bureaucratic and quasi-public nature of modern large-scale corporate
organizations.
It should be pointed out that Berle, in PWP, did not advocate the
complete usurpation of the market with politically-driven controls in the
sense of a communistic “socialization” of industrial production and capital allocation; on the contrary, he went to great lengths in the book’s final
chapter to highlight the differences between his perceived view of the
American system of corporate financing and governance and its Soviet
Russian counterpart. Berle’s considerably more modest aim in PWP was
to highlight what he saw as an already prominent aspect of the essentially
market-based, capitalistic, American corporate governance system of the
mid-twentieth century, and also to explain and normatively rationalize
the key institutional features of this phenomenon. What Berle envisaged
was a rich dual framework of endogenous market and civil society constraints on managerial decision-making power in public companies, with
the inevitable gaps in the former type of control being “plugged” by the
latter, and vice versa.

91. PWP, supra note 13, at 102.
92. See id. at 103.
93. Id. at 115.
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In essence, then, Berle emphasized that an autonomous, managerially-centric system of corporate financing and governance need not entail the loss of executive accountability. On the contrary, Berle’s public
consensus theory demonstrated that publicly-driven civil society pressures could in effect take the place of privately-driven market pressures
in enforcing functionally effective managerial decision-making within
business organizations of a certain scale and level of influence within
society.
D. Shareholder Democracy as a Socially Instrumental Institution
The diminution of proprietary control and corresponding “publicization” of private sector governance within Berle’s institutional model
posed an important question concerning the rightful position of the
shareholder in relation to the modern corporation. To what extent, if
any, did Berle consider the legal empowerment of shareholders to be an
institutional precondition for the effective functioning of his envisaged
corporate control framework?
Certainly, Berle’s belief in the inherent irrationality of securities
market actors would almost certainly have rendered him hostile to the
contemporary “shareholder primacy” argument, which asserts that shareholders should enjoy powers of initiation and/or intervention in respect
of aspects of core corporate decision-making (for example, in relation to
constitutional design and major restructuring decisions) conventionally
reserved by U.S. corporate law to the board of directors.94 Moreover,
Berle’s lack of faith in the prospects for effective shareholder governance, and the acknowledged limitations of his purported common law
trusteeship principle, means that it is difficult to conceive of him placing
any more than temporary reliance on the fiduciary shareholder wealth
maximization95 norm as an effective regulatory counterweight to managerial hegemony within large-scale corporations.
Academic arguments for legal empowerment of shareholders today,
whether of the more “strong-form” shareholder primacy or “semi-strongform” shareholder wealth maximization variety, tend to derive from a
contractarian frame of reference, which focuses on the alleged instrumental value of shareholding as a distinct function within the business
firm. According to this logic, the shareholder offers his residual riskbearing function to the firm, which he is uniquely equipped to perform in
view of the exceptional degree of “risk-hedging” facilitated by the liquid-

94. For an influential argument to this effect, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
95. On this, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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ity of his investment. In return for exclusively fulfilling this function, the
shareholder is said to “bargain for” correspondingly exclusive residual
profit and voting rights vis-à-vis the firm’s management.96
But Berle never ascribed to the “shareholder as risk-taker” adage.
In AER, he argued that:
The rewards or losses derived from [passive property] bear no necessary relation (if any) to work done, or risk taken, or the usefulness
of the aggregated property. None of the old answers suffice. Both
the original moral base (reward for capacity and thrift) and the
original pragmatic function (need for individual skill in applying
capital) have pretty well disappeared.97

Likewise, in TMC, Berle described how, with the development of
the modern public corporation, the two productive functions traditionally
ascribed to entrepreneurial activity, namely risking of wealth and application of skill, had become separated from one another and vested in
shareholders and management respectively. On this basis, Berle claimed
that there was no longer an economic justification for awarding shareholders corporate profits beyond the “fair return to capital” that is sufficient to induce them to continue risking their wealth in corporate equity.
To award profits to shareholders beyond this threshold served no useful
purpose insofar as shareholders could not be encouraged to apply a
greater degree of skill or effort to business affairs given their complete
non-involvement in the corporate-managerial process. 98 In the same
work, Berle compared the position of the modern day shareholder to that
of a bondholder or lender of money, and argued that the distinction that
had hitherto been drawn between these two types of investors was now
of little value. Like a bondholder, an equity holder in effect had an expectation of receiving “interest” in the form of periodic dividends, followed by repayment of the “principal” via resale of his holding on a liquid marketplace.99
In any event, Berle placed little faith in the shareholder franchise as
a potential influence vis-à-vis managers, noting that “the usual stockholder has little power over the affairs of the enterprise, and his vote, if
he has one, is rarely capable of being used as an instrument of democrat96. On this, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
CORPORATE LAW 35–39 (Harvard paperback ed. 1996) (1991); Gavin Kelly & John Parkinson,
The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist Approach in PARKINSON ET AL., supra
note 43, at 113, 114–21; Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192–95 (2002).
97. AER, supra note 14, at 43.
98. TMC, supra note 1, at 299–302.
99. Id. at 245–47.
OF
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ic control.”100 Further, he observed how “[a]s the number of stockholders increases, the capacity of each to express opinions is extremely limited” with the effect that “[n]o one is bound to take notice of them.”101
Seemingly with these considerations in mind, Berle pondered in PWP
whether:
If we were building the American economic system anew, we might
wonder whether the present system of stockholders’ votes was the
best way, or even a good way, of choosing managers or of locating
power. It continues chiefly because no one has come up with a better scheme.102

Berle defended the institution of self-selecting boards as being inevitable on the basis that external stockholders lacked the knowledge to
elect representatives with sufficient and relevant technical acumen to
deal with the complex problems typically faced by modern business corporations. In a passage that would no doubt provoke the ire of many
present-day shareholder rights lobbyists, Berle insisted that:
[u]ntil the community on the one hand or the ritualistic stockholders
on the other develop far more inclination and capacity for understanding difficult problems and reaching wise personnel decisions,
economic power perhaps is best located in a sort of government of
best minds, ultimately responsible to a community consensus which
sets up general objectives, standards of performance, and results.103

Berle’s antipathy towards the shareholder empowerment agenda did
not, however, result in the complete elimination of the shareholder from
his institutional vision. Rather, Berle continued to recognize the importance of shareholding as a politico-economic institution within modern
American capitalist society. On this basis he advanced a novel and considered defense of the shareholder protectorate agenda, albeit in a relatively limited form (i.e., as entailing only a residual dual entitlement to
voting and profit-taking without any further rights of intervention or influence in respect of corporate decision-making). In other words, Berle
ultimately defended shareholder democracy104 in its barest form, whilst

100. TMC, supra note 1, at 83.
101. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xix.
102. PWP, supra note 13, at 107.
103. Id. at 109.
104. Admittedly, the term “shareholder democracy” only imperfectly encapsulates the notion
referred to, given that the political-democratic analogy does not account for the peculiar economic
profit-taking rights that corporate equity holders enjoy in conjunction with their voting rights.
Therefore we use this term only for want of a better term to describe the phenomenon which we
believe Berle defended.
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rejecting any more extensive alternative methods for the legal empowerment of shareholders in corporate governance.
Berle’s defense of shareholder democracy on politico-economic
grounds consisted of two main “sub-defenses”: (1) a defense of the institution of shareholder voting (the political dimension of shareholder democracy); and (2) a defense of the shareholder’s entitlement to receive
dividends (the economic dimension of shareholder democracy).
1. Berle’s Defense of the Shareholder’s Right to Vote
(The Political Dimension)
Berle presented the notion of shareholder democracy principally on
the basis of its ideological implications for the wider political economy
in which corporations operated. A significant factor underlying Berle’s
continuing support for shareholder democracy was his apparent belief
that the progressive diminution of the shareholder’s proprietary economic influence over corporate affairs varied inversely with the shareholder’s
growing political influence as a general civil society actor. According to
Berle:
The former property owner, as he loses his importance in carrying
on economic initiative, is increasingly becoming important as a
consumer and as a political factor through his opinions and through
his vote.105

Berle explained that, in this latter capacity, a shareholder’s opinions
“may have quasi-political importance, similar to that of constituents who
write letters to their congressman.”106 On this basis, Berle presented the
seemingly archaic and outmoded institution of the annual corporate
shareholders’ meeting in a novel and progressive light, by seeing it as a
formal ceremonial fulcrum around which the process of public and political consensus formation could develop. Berle argued that “though
methods of locating power and choosing its holders may have become
obsolete by rational standards, they nevertheless work remarkably
well.” 107 This was, in Berle’s opinion, attributable to the fact that
“[c]ommunity consensus has established minimum standards of capacity
and acceptability for the holders of such power,” which “are generally
taken into account by the people who operate the processes and rituals of
selection.”108 According to this process, “a mandate, derived from obsolete processes of selection, will continue to be satisfactory for long pe105. PWP, supra note 13, at 117.
106. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xix.
107. PWP, supra note 13, at 107.
108. Id.
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riods of time if the men selected are acceptable by community standards.”109 In turn, Berle claimed, “[d]irectors of corporations whose control is held by the ‘public’ (that is to say, by a great number of scattered
shareholders) probably pay greater attention to the unwritten, uncrystallized, but very real standards set up by the public consensus than do the
holders of undisputed control.”110
In essence, Berle’s corporate governance vision could be said to
comprise centralized and autonomous managerial decision-making
power “checked” extraneously by a dynamic and largely informal body
of public and political opinion vis-à-vis corporate affairs. Within this
model, the corporate shareholders’ meeting retains limited functional
value as a formal institutional conduit for articulation and expression of
the multi-faceted and often inchoate public consensus within economic
society. Shareholders, meanwhile, acquire a powerful dual significance
in their capacity as simultaneous economic and political participants in
the governance process.
2. Berle’s Defence of the Shareholder’s Right to Receive Dividends
(The Economic Dimension)
As well as arguing for preservation of the shareholder’s voting entitlement, Berle also at notable points in his work provided very convincing normative support for the shareholder’s traditional right to receive
dividends. In view of Berle’s rejection of the notion that shareholders
fulfilled any meaningful risk-taking function within the modern corporation, his defense of their entitlement to a periodic share of corporate profits (traditionally regarded as the “reward” for entrepreneurial risk-taking)
might initially appear surprising.
Crucially, however, Berle defended the shareholder’s dividend right
principally on welfarist grounds as an institutional precondition for the
extensive provision of social security via private sector means. In his
1932 exchange with Dodd, Berle highlighted the fact that in the United
States, public corporations had become crucial not just as significant employers and suppliers of goods and services, but also as the primary medium for generating (through stock market returns) sustainable income
streams to fund socially essential financial services. Berle recorded that
109. Id. at 108. In a very similar vein, Berle argued in AER that “[t]he managers of American
corporations who hold power, though it is extra-governmental, satisfy customary requirements by a
paper vote of stockholders. But they justify themselves by running their corporations well according
to prevailing standards. If they do this, few people ask whether the fiction of a corporate election
amounts to much. The telephone company is well run; the steel is well made and in adequate supply; the conditions of production are decent; the price is acceptable.” AER, supra note 14, at 43.
110. PWP, supra note 13, at 109–10.
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by 1932, over half of the U.S. population was either directly or indirectly
dependent on corporate securities (whether held personally or institutionally) for the purpose of social security provision.111 For this reason he
believed that, with the abandonment of the shareholder protectorate
agenda in its entirety, “it becomes necessary to present a system (none
has been presented) of law or government, or both, by which responsibility for control of national wealth and income is so apportioned and enforced that the community as a whole, or at least the great bulk of it, is
properly taken care of.”112 Thus, corporate equities remained of socioeconomic value within Berle’s thinking primarily as aspects of financial
property in their own right. Accordingly, the principle of shareholder
democracy retained significance insofar as profit-taking and voting rights
that attach to corporate equities formed the basis of their identity and
value as tradable financial commodities; in this capacity, they formed a
centrifugal element of the United States’ property-based welfare system.
Berle recognized, however, that the capacity of the shareholder democracy principle to command widespread legitimacy within American
society as a contributor to the country’s welfare system depended on
whether, as a matter of fact, the great bulk of its population was satisfactorily provided for via returns from public corporate equity.113 To this
end, Berle noted in his later work that, over the course of the four decades following his exchange with Dodd, corporate equity holding had
spread exponentially across American society to the extent that, by 1968,
shares had become by far the most popular form of personal wealthholding in the United States. Berle observed that between 1929 and
1967, the number of shareholders in the U.S. had increased from around
1 million to between 22 and 23 million.
Berle further argued that the shareholder’s residual entitlement to
corporate dividends was justifiable on politico-economic grounds as a
means towards ensuring a sufficient distribution of wealth in American
society so as to enable widespread self-reliance and self-realization.114
Indeed, in TMC, Berle went so far as to query whether the increased dispersal of industrial ownership—made possible by the modern corporation—represented “a permanent change in the ownership of industrial
wealth comparable to the shift in land ownership which was an outward
growth of the French Revolution.”115 And, although Berle acknowledged
that under the system of private security ownership “certain individuals
111. FWCMAT, supra note 3, at 1367–68.
112. Id. at 1368.
113. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xxiii.
114. Id. at xxiii.
115. Id. at 60.
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may perhaps acquire a disproportionate share of wealth,” he nevertheless
regarded this as “an incident to the system and not its major premise.”
He opined that “statistically, it plays a relatively minor part.”116 In this
context, shareholder entitlement to dividends was (somewhat ironically
from a present day ideological standpoint) advanced by Berle as “a vehicle for rationalized wealth distribution corresponding to and serving
the American ideal of a just civilization,”117 and as an alternative redistributive mechanism to more rigid and statist measures, such as a national minimum wage or “governmentally assured minimum income.”118
Just like the associated welfarist justification advanced by Berle for the
shareholder’s right to dividends, however, Berle’s wider economicdistributive argument for the phenomenon was contingent on the actual
realization of the distributive process across the vast majority of the
community, to the extent that “every American family has its fragment of
that position and of the wealth by which the opportunity to develop individuality becomes fully actualized.”119
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF BERLE’S THEORY FOR
CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATES
The core point that we try to make in this article is that by studying
Berle’s thinking on corporate governance in an integral and contextual
way, it is possible to deduce a consistent ideological thread running
throughout his lifetime scholarship. That uniting thread transcends the
many apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies that are prone to appear
on the basis of more particularized readings of Berle’s work. In particular, it is our belief that the three underlying and overlapping central
themes of the Berleian corporate governance project—namely managerial autonomy, civil society oversight, and shareholder democracy as a
socially instrumental institution—are together capable of representing a
coordinating nexus around which Berle’s work can be consistently understood.
We hope that this finding will contribute to the ongoing academic
debate on corporate governance, both in the United States and beyond, in
at least two important respects: (1) the role that might be played by the
state in corporate governance; and (2) the nature of the relationship between shareholders and the corporation.
116. FWCMAT, supra note 3, at 1365.
117. 1968 Introduction, supra note 42, at xxiv.
118. Id. at xxiii.
119. Id. at xxiii. Although Berle acknowledged that this distributive process was “still in its
infancy,” he felt that the development of institutionalized pension funds as a method of widespread
indirect stockholding gave hope for the future in this regard. See id. at xxiv.
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A. Corporate Governance and the State
It is widely acknowledged that the last three decades of the twentieth century represented something of a revolutionary period in the development of academic thinking on corporate governance in the United
States. In particular, this era witnessed a progressive growth in the influence of economic logic within corporate governance scholarship, which
resulted in the widespread application by scholars of market-based incentive and disciplinary mechanisms as perceived institutional solutions to
the corporate accountability deficit. A common theme underlying many
such “agency costs” approaches to the corporate governance problem
was a uniting faith in the informational efficiency of primary and secondary corporate capital markets, and the resultant credibility of the
stock price mechanism as an effective “score card” of managerial performance and the comparative robustness of firm-level governance systems. An implicit normative outcome of such analyses is the conceptual
interfusion of corporate “efficiency”—understood in the narrow sense of
managerial responsiveness to stock market signals—with the dual tenets
of “accountability” and “legitimacy” in the wider socio-political sense.
In other words, corporations that are compliant with the dictates of external capital market actors (e.g., institutional shareholders, analysts, ratings
agencies, and independent directors) are deemed to be accountable companies. This suggests, in turn, that the possession and exercise of managerial decision-making power within these firms is socially legitimate.120
By this course of logic, the continuing social problem of managerial
power and the need for its public legitimization within democratic civil
society is conveniently elided by reference to the capital market as an
accountability mechanism. In particular, the contractarian frame of reference from which “agency costs” analyses derive is built on the implicit
understanding that market-driven pressures and rules are ultimately capable of limiting the decision-making power of corporate managers to
socially unproblematic levels.
Admittedly, some contractarian theorists recognize the inherent limitations of pure market-driven pressures and governance structures as
an effective constraint on managerial hegemony, and consequently accept the inevitability of mandatory corporate governance rules as set

120. For a historical account and normative rationalization of the development of this extraneous stock market-based control framework in the U.S., with particular regard to the perceived function of independent directors therein, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in
the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV.
1465 (2007).
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down rigidly by the state.121 However, even in these more interventionist
contractarian analyses, the basic normative premise remains that the
state’s legitimate role should ultimately be restricted to facilitating the
“neutral,” market-driven, private ordering process as opposed to superseding it in any way through politically-motivated regulatory measures.122 The problem with such a de-politicized conception of the regulatory state’s role in corporate governance, however, is that it refuses to
consider the possibility identified by Berle that public civil society pressures might act as an effective proxy for the inevitable limitations of private market measures as a constraint on managerial decision-making
power. By assuming that politically-driven rules in corporate governance are a priori illegitimate, and correspondingly that market-driven or
market-facilitative governance rules (whether reversible or mandatory in
form) are in themselves capable of constraining managerial power to socially unproblematic levels, contractarian logic in effect reasons away the
inevitable residual decision-making power wielded by senior corporate
officers. It therefore fails to confront the possibility (implicit in Berle’s
analysis in PWP) that a dual framework of market and political drivers of
corporate governance reform—with the latter ultimately subject to the
proper constitutional checks and balances of a liberal democracy—might
provide a more effective and legitimate system of constraints on managerial power than market-based pressures acting alone.
One further related implication of Berle’s thinking is the undermining of the orthodox characterization of politically-motivated corporate
governance norms as being necessarily rigid, regulatory, and bureaucratic. This is in contrast to market-driven norms, which by virtue of the
implicit private ordering process can be more flexible, informal, and factually tailored in nature.123 However, in PWP, Berle identified that the
inchoate public consensus can fulfill an indirect role comparable to that
of stock market pressures within today’s corporate governance system.
In other words, it can provide informal pre-regulatory pressures for go121. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1395 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549 (1989).
122. Gordon, for example, claims that “it is a mistake to assume that full contractual freedom
in corporate law would necessarily lead to private wealth maximization. The existence of some
mandatory rules may lead to better contracts. In other words, the mixed system of optional and
mandatory legal rules that we observe may be best even from an essentially contractarian perspective.” Id. at 1554.
123. For a theoretical exposition of the private rule selection process at play within the U.S.
corporate law context, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). For a similar rationalization of the (more overtly contractarian) English model of company law, see R.C. Nolan, The Continuing Evolution of Shareholder Governance,
65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 92 (2006).
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vernance reform which, in turn, motivate endogenous, corporate, institutional design by boards as a preemptive response to potential statist regulatory measures.124 In this way, politicized civil society pressures can be
given license to fulfill a structurally similar disciplinary function to that
performed by “neutral” stock market pressures within the contractarian
governance paradigm whilst, at the same time, recognizing the continuing (albeit inevitably limited) role of the latter type of pressure as a managerial accountability mechanism. The resultant picture that emerges is
of a rich dual framework of economic and political drivers of endogenous corporate norm evolution at the individual firm level, reinforced in
the last place by a sophisticated multi-partite regulatory system that is
responsive to both market and civil society pressures for facilitative regulatory intervention.
B. Corporate Governance and Shareholders
The second, and more radical, outcome that follows from Berle’s
overall position concerns the continuing normative validity of the shareholder’s relatively privileged position within the corporate governance
hierarchy. In Part III.C.2, we emphasized that, within Berle’s vision, the
continuing legitimacy of the notion of shareholder democracy (in both a
legal and wider social sense) was contingent on the ideal of an American
shareholding democracy being practically realized in the near future.
Berle predicted that, as a result, beneficial corporate ownership together
with the associated economic benefits would come to be spread diffusely
across a sizeable proportion of the country’s population. Whether this is
indeed the case today is a subject of potentially fierce empirical and interpretative debate beyond the scope of this article. Certainly, however,
it is doubtful whether the American shareholder populace in 2010 can be
regarded as a sufficiently representative cross-sector of the U.S. citizenry
to permit the politico-economic justification of the shareholder wealth
maximization norm on grounds of effective social security provision or
widespread individual self-realization alone.
Moreover, if it is the case today that the annual shareholder meeting
is not regarded as sufficiently pluralist in form to elicit the wider indirect
engagement of the general public in corporate governance affairs, it follows that the institution of shareholder suffrage is no longer (if indeed it
ever was) capable of representing an appropriate formal fulcrum for public consensus formation. If so, then it may reasonably be questioned
whether the public consensus vis-à-vis corporate affairs would be more
124. On the significance of private, pre-regulatory rule-making by boards in response to orthodox economic pressure from shareholders, see Bebchuk, supra note 94, at 869–70.
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effectively and legitimately mobilized around an additional or alternative
institutional nexus that provides a more inclusive quasi-democratic representation of the public interest in large-scale economic organization.
A possible starting point for further inquiry in this regard would be reconsideration of whether there is a legitimate role for worker involvement in corporate governance as a potential proxy for comprehensive
civil society engagement in the shareholder franchise. Additionally, or
alternatively, there is a potential normative case for corporatist state participation in governance processes at an individual firm or industry level,
perhaps in conjunction with the federal government’s recognized role
today as ultimate economic risk-bearer in enterprises of core social significance and impact, such as in the banking and automobile manufacturing sectors.
In any event, the underlying point is that with the rejection of stock
market responsiveness as an exhaustive criterion of managerial accountability in itself, there arises the corresponding necessity to acknowledge
potential additional institutional mechanisms for achieving the social
legitimacy of corporate decision-making power. If the solutions that this
inquiry encourages appear radical in nature, it only signifies the extent of
the corporate accountability deficit and the resultant importance of ensuring its effective resolution within contemporary economic society.

